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Correction for “Iconic photographs and the ebb and flow of
empathic response to humanitarian disasters,” by Paul Slovic,
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with “at the time of publication of Aylan’s photo.”
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The power of visual imagery is well known, enshrined in such
familiar sayings as “seeing is believing” and “a picture is worth a
thousand words.” Iconic photos stir our emotions and transform
our perspectives about life and the world in which we live. On
September 2, 2015, photographs of a young Syrian child, Aylan Kurdi,
lying face-down on a Turkish beach, filled the front pages of news-
papers worldwide. These images brought much-needed attention to
the Syrian war that had resulted in hundreds of thousands of deaths
and created millions of refugees. Here we present behavioral data
demonstrating that, in this case, an iconic photo of a single child had
more impact than statistical reports of hundreds of thousands of
deaths. People who had been unmoved by the relentlessly rising
death toll in Syria suddenly appeared to care much more after having
seen Aylan’s photograph; however, this newly created empathy
waned rather quickly. We briefly examine the psychological processes
underlying these findings, discuss some of their policy implications,
and reflect on the lessons they provide about the challenges to effec-
tive intervention in the face of mass threats to human well-being.
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In June 2016, 51 US State Department officials who had beeninvolved in the US government’s response to the Syria crisis
during the past 5 y sent a message to their Director of Policy
Planning. The message was remarkable in its angry and strongly
worded dissent toward the Obama administration’s policies of
restraint, especially because it was drafted and signed by so many
individuals who had been party to the creation of those policies.
The dissenting document implored the Obama administration
to use military force to compel the Syrian regime to cease its
attacks on civilians and negotiate a political solution to a crisis
that has left “over 400,000 people dead, hundreds of thousands
still at risk from regime sieges, and 12 million people from a
population of 23 million displaced from their homes” (1). The
dissenters concluded that “the moral rationale for taking steps to
end the deaths and suffering in Syria, after five years of brutal
war, is evident and unquestionable.”
What is also remarkable is that, during the relentless and well-
publicized buildup of casualties and displaced persons over this
5-y period, it took so long for these gruesome statistics to motivate a
public call by top-level government officials for aggressive action
against the Syrian regime. This is a dramatic testament to the
inability of statistics to convey the meaning of mass atrocities and
impact policy. Psychological research helps explain this statistical
impotency and the powerful but fleeting success of one iconic
image in sensitizing the world to the grim realities beneath the
surface of the numbers.
Imagery, Emotion, and Meaning
The power of visual imagery is well known, enshrined in such
familiar sayings as “seeing is believing” and “a picture is worth a
thousand words.” Iconic photos stir our emotions and transform
our perspectives about life and the world in which we live. Who
has not seen and been moved by such images as the mushroom
cloud, the young Vietnamese girl fleeing naked from a napalm
bombing, the Chinese man facing down a column of tanks in
Tiananmen Square, the view of earth from space, and the jetliner
flying into the World Trade Center? Psychological research
confirms the greater impact of images over statistics, even when
the amount of exposure is roughly equal (2–5).
More recently, on September 2, 2015, another striking pho-
tograph joined the list. A photograph of a young Syrian child,
Aylan Kurdi, lying face-down on a Turkish beach, was viewed by
more than 20 million people on social media (6) (Fig. 1). (The
boy’s name was Alan Shenu, however we have chosen to use the
name given by Turkish authorities and publicized in media re-
ports, Aylan Kurdi.) The next day, the photo was on the front
pages of newspapers worldwide. This photograph brought much-
needed attention to the Syrian war and the plight of its refugees,
which resulted in short-term but important increases in individ-
ual aid and refugee policy changes in many countries (6).
However, the Syrian crisis had been ongoing for more than 4 y
before Aylan’s death. During that time, sources such as the
Syrian Observatory for Human Rights had been regularly re-
leasing updates on the steadily rising death toll, conservatively
estimated at 250,000 at the time of publication of Aylan’s photo.
Clearly, the statistics of a massive human catastrophe and their
“moral rationale” were available for people and governments to
act on, but little response was evident.
New behavioral data from information searches and donations
demonstrates that, in this case, an iconic photo of a single child
was worth more than hundreds of thousands of statistical lives.
People who were unmoved by the relentlessly rising death toll in
Syria appeared to care much more about the crisis there after
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having seen Aylan’s photograph. Here we briefly examine the
psychological processes underlying these findings, discuss some
of their policy implications, and reflect on the lessons they pro-
vide about the challenges to effective intervention in the face of
mass threats to human well-being.
We first examined two datasets to assess the effect of the
photograph of Aylan Kurdi on the public’s interest in and con-
cern about the Syrian refugee crisis. We collected Google trend
data on searches worldwide for the terms “Syria,” “refugees,”
and “Aylan” from before (August 2015) and after Aylan’s photo
was published. Such publicly available data track how often a
particular search term is entered relative to the total search
volume (7). As can be seen, these data show a dramatic increase
in searches for the terms “Aylan,” “refugees,” and “Syria” on the
days after publication of the photo (Fig. 2). These searches de-
clined during the subsequent weeks, but still remained above the
August 2015 baseline.
We also obtained data on monetary donations to the Swedish
Red Cross for a fund specifically designated to aid Syrian refugees.
The funding campaign started on August 4, 2015, almost a month
before Aylan’s photo appeared, and continued until November 30,
2015. Thus, we can use these data to estimate the photograph’s
effect in this specific context.
Fig. 3 shows the number of daily donations to the Red Cross,
and Fig. 4 shows the total daily donation amounts during this
period (excluding single donations exceeding 1,000,000 SEK). As
can be seen, both increased greatly from the week before to the
week after the publication of Aylan’s photo. The mean number
of daily donations during the week after publication of the photo
was more than 100-fold greater compared with the week before.
This effect was sustained until 5 wk after the photo’s appearance,
when the number declined to a level no different from that in the
week before publication.
Similarly, the mean amount donated daily during the week
after the photo’s publication was 55-fold higher compared with
the week before (1,908,437 SEK vs. 34,284 SEK). During the
second week after the photograph appeared, donation amounts
were lower (404,626 SEK), but still approximately 11-fold greater
than the week before publication. It was not until 6 wk after pub-
lication that the mean donations were at a level (57,990 SEK)
that was not significantly different from that in the week
before publication.
These data illustrate the iconic victim effect. The photograph
of a single identified individual captured the attention of people
and moved them to take interest and provide aid in ways that
were not motivated by statistics of hundreds of thousands of
deaths. The data also show that this form of empathy quickly
faded and donations subsided, even though the number of Syrian
refugees seeking asylum in Sweden was relatively high and
consistent throughout the period that we sampled (36,000–
40,000 per month).
Does the iconic victim response diminish rapidly as the image
fades from memory and the media lose interest? Judging from
the foregoing data, this appears to be the case. Additional data
from the Swedish Red Cross are somewhat more encouraging,
however. The number of monthly donors signing up for repeated
contributions increased by a factor of 10 (from 106 in August
2015 to 1,061 in September 2015), and only 0.02% of those
monthly donors had opted out by January 2016. This suggests
that the iconic victim effect may lead not only to large and im-
mediate increases in the number of one-time donors and average
donations per person, but also to more prolonged and sustained
commitment when individuals sign up for repeated donations.
Nonetheless, close to 1 y after the appearance of Aylan’s
photo, and despite the publication of other touching images of
imperiled refugee children, little seems to have changed (8, 9).
After a string of boat disasters claimed 2,510 lives between
January and May and put year 2016 on course to be the deadliest
ever for refugees, Aylan Kurdi’s father said that “my Aylan died
for nothing” (10). By the end of May 2016, leaders at the World
Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul appeared to show little in-
terest in addressing what has been described as the worst hu-
manitarian crisis since World War II, angering many of the aid
organizations in attendance (11). In June, the State Department
dissenters could no longer keep silent. Other prominent states-
men, diplomats, and journalists have since joined the call for
some form of military intervention to stop the relentless
slaughter of innocent people in Syria (12–14). Even US Secretary
of State John Kerry expressed (privately) dissatisfaction with the
administration’s lack of forceful response (15).
What Have We Learned from the Story of Aylan?
One of the important lessons from the story of Aylan is that we
cannot assume that the statistics of mass human crises will cap-
ture our attention or move us to take action, no matter how large
the numbers. Our search data show that the world was basically
asleep as the body count in Syria rose steadily into the hundreds
of thousands. Perhaps this should not surprise us. A famous
saying, sometimes attributed to Josef Stalin, observed that “One
man’s death is a tragedy, a million deaths is a statistic.” Similarly,
economist Thomas Schelling (16) wrote that “the death of a
particular person evokes anxiety and sentiment, guilt and awe,
responsibility and religion...[but] most of this awesomeness dis-
appears when we deal with statistical death” (p. 142).
Psychological research supports these observations. A single
individual in distress, with a name and a face, often evokes a
Fig. 1. Cumulative Syrian death toll (data from the Jerusalem Center for
Genocide Prevention and the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights).
Fig. 2. Google Trend data on the relative popularity of search terms
“Syria,” “refugees,” and “Aylan,” August–September 2015. Note that
Google Trends does not provide numbers of search requests; rather, the
maximum number in the figure is scaled to 100, and the other values are
proportional to that.
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stronger response than multiple persons (3, 17, 18). We have
found that this “compassion fade” may begin when an incident
involving a single person expands to as few as two people. In one
study (19), participants were asked to make donations and to
report how they felt about donating to either a single needy child
or two needy children, each of whom was identified with a
photograph, name, and age. Positive feelings about donating
declined substantially when the group size was two, and this
decline in feeling was predictive of lower levels of donation. If we
begin to lose feeling and response at two persons, it is no wonder
that we experience “psychic numbing” when the numbers reach
the thousands (18, 20).
Various psychological factors appear to drive psychic numbing
and compassion fade. It may be natural and relatively easy to
empathize and feel compassion with a single identified individ-
ual, but it is difficult to “scale up” this emotion when we need to
consider more than one individual. If one feels strongly about
one person in distress, the appearance of a second needy indi-
vidual will not lead to twice the level of emotion. Limitations of
imagery and attention also play a role. Research reported by
Hamilton and Sherman (21) and Thompson et al. (22) has
demonstrated that a single individual, unlike a group, is viewed
as a psychologically coherent unit. This leads to more focused
attention, more extensive processing of information, and stron-
ger feelings about individuals than about groups. The failure of
large numbers to convey images and emotions is well known and
documented in research studies and in popular narratives and
discourse (ref. 20; www.arithmeticofcompassion.org). Thousands
of wrenching photographs, much like statistics, can also quickly
leave us numb (23).
Thus, the valuation of human lives not only may be charac-
terized by a decreasing sensitivity as the numbers increase, but
may sometimes even show a decline as imagery fades and attention
falters. We have described these tendencies as failings in “the ar-
ithmetic of compassion” (20). The strong reaction to the image of
Aylan coupled with indifference toward the statistics of thousands
of lives lost in Syria illustrates this problematic arithmetic.
Recognition of these shortcomings has led some to argue
“against empathy” (24). Bloom (24) has pointed out that the
problem with empathy is that it is biased in its focus on the single
individual and is innumerate in its failure to increase or even be
sustained with the growing number of individuals in need.
Nonetheless, we do believe that empathy is a necessary,
though not sufficient, condition for action by both individuals
and societies. Aylan woke the world briefly, providing a window
of opportunity during which people and their governments began
paying attention to the Syrian refugee crisis, understood its se-
verity, and were motivated to act. Where there was a need that
was relatively easy to fill, such as with donating to the Red Cross,
the response was swift and sizeable, at least for a while. Without
that empathic response, the donations shown in Fig. 4 likely
would have been consistently small. Thus, empathy can create a
strong motivation to act. But lacking a political solution to the
underlying warfare in Syria, little progress was made in halting
the killing or stemming the tide of refugees. This failure to react
can be viewed in part as a failure of society to provide compelling
action alternatives once empathy is aroused.
Incoherent Values for Lifesaving
Simply put, the US government does not have an established, co-
herent policy for preventing and responding to genocide and mass
atrocities (25, p. 3).
Given enough time and suffering, the statistics of mass crises may
finally gain attention and motivate attempts at intervention, as
with the State Department dissent noted earlier. President
Obama has certainly seen the statistics from Syria and agonized
over them. Strong efforts to protect civilian lives would be con-
sistent with his assertion that “preventing mass atrocities and
genocide is a core national security interest and a core moral
responsibility of the United States” (26). However, the dissent
memo also makes it clear that there are many serious obstacles
to intervention that must be weighed against the potential life-
saving benefits. US and Russian relations might well deteriorate
and lead to conflict. The military might suffer losses, and ag-
gressive actions might increase the threat of domestic terrorism
or hinder attacks against the Islamic State.
Conflicting objectives inevitably arise as challenges to efforts
to manage human and environmental crises; as noted by
America’s United Nations (UN) Ambassador Samantha Power,
“you have to take into account the other collateral issues that
you’re dealing with on the international stage” (27). We are
concerned that without a systematic method of analysis that
carefully assesses the desired trade-offs among objectives, deci-
sions will reflect a value for protecting human lives that is far
lower than intended. This hypothesis is derived from theoretical
models of judgment and choice, research on social cognition, and
careful reading of official pronouncements. Its centerpiece is the
“prominence effect” (28), which describes conditions that lead
values revealed by choices to differ systematically from expressed
judgments of value. Specifically, choices need to be justified or
defended in ways that expressed values do not. Prominent at-
tributes enhance justifiability; thus, the more prominent attrib-
utes of a proposed action likely will be weighted more heavily in
choice than would be expected based on the decision maker’s
explicit expressions of the values under consideration.
We argue that the prominence effect may underlie what we
see as a disconnect between expressed and revealed values re-
garding whether or not to act to protect large numbers of ci-
vilian lives under attack in foreign countries. Specifically, we
Fig. 3. Number of daily donations to a Swedish Red Cross campaign des-
ignated specifically for aiding Syrian refugees in Sweden.
Fig. 4. Daily donation amounts to the Swedish Red Cross campaign.
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hypothesize that national security is the more prominent (i.e.,
more defensible) dimension in the context that we are studying
here. The prominence effect may be amplified by decision makers’
response to uncertainty, in that a strong intervention response in
Syria will not necessarily succeed and may instead initiate a series of
surprising and damaging actions. Because chosen actions need to be
justified, deciding in favor of security likely makes a stronger, more
defensible argument than deciding in favor of saving foreign lives,
even when many thousands or millions of lives are at stake.
Where to Next?
Ideally, when information in the form of personal stories, dra-
matic images, or statistical facts wakes us to the necessity to
intervene in the mass killing of innocent people, there will be
strong international laws and institutions to turn to for support.
Unfortunately, however, these do not exist. The Genocide
Convention, drafted in 1948, and a recent complementary doc-
trine, The Responsibility to Protect, have rarely been invoked
(29, 30). The UN, the institution that should be coordinating
interventions, is repeatedly stymied by vetoes from permanent
members of the Security Council acting in their own interests.
Most recently, Russia vetoed a resolution that would have cre-
ated a no-fly zone over the besieged city of Aleppo, its fifth veto
to block action on Syria before the Council (31).
Lacking UN support, the United States and its allies could
decide on their own whether or not to act to protect hundreds of
thousands of lives in the face of the conflicting political, social,
military, and economic counterarguments noted earlier. Risk/
benefit assessments and trade-offs between lives and security
would have to be made. How can we ensure that appropriate
decision-making procedures are used and the debates do not bias
decisions in favor of achieving prominent objectives that are
easier to defend, such as national security, without carefully
weighing these against less-prominent or more uncertain objec-
tives, such as human rights or civilian lives?
Perhaps structured decision-aiding processes have been used
to inform US policy on humanitarian interventions in Syria.
Policy deliberations are not public, but we have seen no evidence
of systematic exercises to ensure that all feasible options have
been considered and that the objective of protecting human lives
has been carefully weighed against security objectives. When ob-
servers have been allowed to speak with those privy to the decision
deliberations regarding humanitarian interventions in Libya and
elsewhere, they report that discussions often took place in an
unstructured, ad hoc manner and placed a premium on justifi-
able arguments for and against action (32).
In the window of opportunity afforded when the likes of Aylan
Kurdi help us grasp the importance of the lives beneath the
numbers, we must create ways to effectively integrate emotions
and slower, more analytic thinking into decision making. For-
tunately, a wide range of decision-aiding techniques have evolved
to help structure discussions and debate with the goal of high-
lighting key considerations and—by making relationships among
these decision elements more transparent—encouraging partic-
ipants to pay attention to areas of agreement and disagreement
(33–36). Three tools are particularly helpful: objective hierar-
chies, performance measures, and consequence tables.
Objective hierarchies provide a vehicle for identifying and
ordering concerns relevant to a decision (36). For example, key
values for intervention decisions to prevent mass atrocities and
genocide will typically include effects on national security, pro-
tection of human lives, economic costs of intervention and aid,
effects on national reputation, and impacts on regional stability.
Each of these fundamental concerns often will include several
subobjectives; “protecting human lives,” for example, includes
both deaths and injuries that might affect either foreign civilians
or members of the intervening military forces.
Performance measures establish one or more specific metrics
that track changes in the objectives related to a proposed action
(37). Developing good measures for changes to each interest is
essential for the consistent evaluation of alternatives, and also
permits clear communication about what matters among the de-
cision participants. Coming up with measures for some objectives is
relatively easy—for example, using dollars to measure cost or
numbers of fatalities for lives lost. Other important objectives, such
as “national security” or “national reputation,” are more difficult
to define, yet deliberations about intervention options will be
improved to the extent that different intervention alternatives
can be compared on these dimensions and all stakeholders are
using the same working definitions (34).
Consequence tables are another key structuring tool used to
emphasize the link between the consequences of actions and the
concerns that matter the most (38). Columns show the different
intervention alternatives under consideration, and rows show the
different values that may be impacted. Each cell of the table thus
indicates what is anticipated to occur if that alternative is selected.
Consequence tables can be kept simple or can incorporate addi-
tional considerations, such as changes in information over time,
thresholds signaling the need for possible shifts in actions, or im-
portant geographic differences among potentially affected regions.
As noted above, the need to justify highly visible and contro-
versial national policy decisions, such as intervening in a foreign
country to prevent genocide, may lead to heavy reliance on the
more prominent (i.e., justifiable) dimensions of choice options
and result in a disconnect between the stated importance of
values and their influence on decisions. This is particularly true
when the process of decision making leads other values, such as
protecting human lives, to become less prominent as the result of
psychic numbing, uncertainty, or other factors. Of course, decision
aids cannot make the tough choices required with respect to in-
terventions intended to prevent genocide and mass atrocities, or
overcome the rigid perspectives of policy makers whose minds are
closed; however, they do have the ability to set out a coherent,
transparent process that provides a defensible argument in support
of a selected action. Vague doctrines, such as “protect the national
interest,” or “promote humanitarian interventions,” can be trans-
lated into clear statements as part of a more fully defined, organized
framework that promotes both understanding and discussion of the
underlying objectives. Surely, for decisions as difficult and emo-
tionally charged as those highlighted by the photograph of Aylan
Kurdi, we should require nothing less.
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